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The mid-Qing philosopher Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) is famous for his criticisms of 
orthodox Neo-Confucianism, especially of the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 School that had, by his 
time, prevailed over intellectual life and state institutions for several centuries.1  The 
heart of his critique rests on a controversial series of claims about the Confucian 
emotional attitude of sympathetic understanding (shu 恕) that he found to be essential 
for moral virtue.2  As Dai sees his Neo-Confucian adversaries, their account of moral 
agency puts a stranglehold on sympathetic understanding, for their strictures against the 
use of desire in moral reasoning prevents someone from sympathetically appreciating 
other human beings in the requisite ways.  Without having healthy desires of one’s own, 
and a sufficient understanding of what those desires should be, we fail to discern the 
standards of good order (li 理) inherent in our condition. 
This much is routinely observed.  What is less appreciated, however, is that 
Dai’s claims about the importance of sympathy and the desires in moral reasoning are 
parasitic on a claim about the importance of sympathy and the desires in reasoning 
about human welfare or well-being.  We depend on them to know the standards of good 
order because, in large part, we depend on them to know what is good for people.  The 
                                               
* JUSTIN TIWALD, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco 
State University. Specialties: Chinese philosophy, ethics, political philosophy. E-mail: 
jtiwald@sfsu.edu 
 253 
importance of this to Dai’s critique is attested by his tendency to portray it as an insight 
he recovered from the ancients, after it was lost on the Song-Ming Neo-Confucians and 
their adherents.3  It is also attested by some of his most plaintive statements, repeated 
like a refrain, describing the state of blindness brought about by his Neo-Confucian 
predecessors’ impoverished picture of moral deliberation. Without the desires and shu, 
he laments again and again, we preclude ourselves from appreciating the ways in which 
our general moral guidelines or ideals can become detached from real-world avenues 
of benefit and harm and thus find ourselves unknowingly “bringing irreparable harm 
(huo 禍 ) to all under Heaven.” 4   It is this particular function of sympathetic 
understanding, where it serves as a way of tracking benefits and harms that I shall focus 
on here. 
Most of us believe that sympathy figures prominently in helping us to better 
appreciate benefits and harms, and I find the same unspoken assumption in much 
discussion of shu.  However, I also find that the mechanism we usually imagine 
sympathy to rely on for tracking well-being tends to greatly oversimplify and thereby 
underestimate its importance.   
Consider, for example, a case in which a powerful mayor wants to raze an entire 
neighborhood to make room for airport expansion but, upon realizing some sympathetic 
appreciation for the residents of that neighborhood, is led to look elsewhere for real 
estate.  How, in particular, has sympathy brought about this change of heart?  Normally 
we assume that it is the mayor’s act of imagining himself in the place of the residents 
(an act I shall call “perspective-taking”) that enables him to sympathetically appreciate 
the extent of the harm he might do.5  Through sympathy, he imagines what it would be 
like to lose the home in which multiple generations of one’s family was raised, and he 
focuses on the profound psychic injury it does to deprive someone of a lifelong 
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community.  The problem with this picture, however, is that for purposes of appraising 
benefits and harms, the affects and interests we imaginatively attribute to others are not 
always the right ones.  For example, we might attribute to others desires they do not 
have, or they might well have desires that are self-destructive.  The response, then, is 
usually to correct for the desires that we imaginatively simulate, and to do so by 
specifying that they should be rational or informed desires—those that we would have 
with working faculties and under full information.   
This is the move I find to be, at one and the same time, missing from Dai’s 
account and profoundly unfair to sympathy’s robust role in moral deliberation.  It is 
unfair to sympathy because it tends to slough off the hard work of determining which 
desires are the right ones onto something else, when in fact it is sympathy itself that 
does a great deal of this work.  This move is missing from Dai’s account because it 
tends to portray the final arbiter of benefits and harms as a kind of idealized first person, 
deliberating (rationally and with full information) about what she wants.  For Dai Zhen, 
as I illustrate, wanting something alone is not enough to make it good for us.  It must 
also be something others would want for us, insofar as they sympathetically understand 
us.   I find in Dai Zhen a more robust and plausible account of shu than mere 
perspective-taking allows, and this chapter is devoted to the explication of such an 
account. 
A word about terminology.  In making this argument, I refer to the ability to 
track benefits and harms as an ability to track “welfare” or “well-being.”   I use these 
latter terms in a thin sense, which describes whatever it is that improves or declines 
when one does well or does poorly.  The advantage of using it in this way is that it helps 
to unify Dai Zhen’s many statements to the effect that the more orthodox picture of 
moral agency prevents its adherents from taking account of various forms of harm in 
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their moral deliberations.  Whether a particular iteration of this refrain invokes the 
“harming of others” (huo ren 禍人),6 or more dramatically the  “injury” (shang 傷) 
done to “the people” (min 民),7 the point is the same: without making use of our own 
desires and shu, we have no way to guarantee that our moral judgments will take 
account of the well-being of the affected parties.   
To be sure, there is no single word in Dai Zhen’s philosophical lexicon that 
corresponds to “welfare” or “well-being.”   However, it would be a mistake to conclude 
from this that there is nothing systematic to say about human well-being and its function 
in Dai’s moral thought.  Indeed, if we look almost anywhere in the history of 
philosophy, well-being tends to be the one normative concept most conspicuous in its 
lexical absence, for moral thinkers of all ages have rarely written about well-being as 
such and have instead assumed (much like an ordinary speaker today) that their 
audiences will understand implicitly that references to such things as “happiness” or 
“prosperity” all have some bearing on a common thing—well-being—and furthermore 
that this common thing is important for ethics.8  Indeed, we should be worried if it were 
not.   
 How does a sympathetic understanding of others bring their well-being to bear 
on our moral evaluations?  Here I suspect most of us have a ready answer: by allowing 
us to reconstruct the point of view of others, allowing us to experience it (or some 
simulation of it) for ourselves.  Such is the nature of this sort of exercise, however, that 
it cannot possibly be a dependable indicator of well-being on its own.  Consider the 
particular kind of perspective-taking advocated by Dai Zhen, where we track the good 
of others, in part, by asking what we would “desire” (yu 欲) if we were them.9  This 
might work well enough in certain paradigmatic cases, when weighing the important 
and nearly universal desires for companionship, nourishment, a stable source of income, 
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etc.  But surely there are times when the moral agent’s desires are simply the wrong 
ones to use in the synthesis of the other’s point of view.  I mean this in at least two 
senses.  First, they might be “wrong” in the sense that the other may not have them, 
thus making the object of desire less beneficial for the other than it is for the moral 
agent.  I should always bear in mind, for example, that not everyone is fond of keeping 
cats as pets, as I am.10  Second, they might simply be “wrong” in the sense that they 
have little relationship to well-being, whether or not they rightly inform our 
reconstruction of the other’s point of view.  I might legitimately share with Wang a 
powerful yearning to see our home team win.  But it would be strange to say that 
achieving the object of our desire (the triumph of our home team) contributes to Wang’s 
well-being in the same way that having a constant source of nourishment does, even if 
she desires it with the same intensity.  Just because Wang has the desire, in other words, 
it does not follow that satisfying it will contribute to her welfare. 
 If we want to preserve the perspective-taking contributions of sympathy, then 
we will have to prop them up with further insights and specifications.  We will have to 
find some way of making those desires that have an intimate relationship to the other’s 
well-being, and only those desires, normative for our sympathetic reconstruction of her 
point of view, so that we do not mistakenly project a strong desire for house cats on an 
ailurophobe, or an unhealthy obsession with winning on anyone.  Something must aid 
our exercise in perspective-taking so as to guarantee that we extend the right sorts of 
desires to others, and the key test of those desires, surely, will be whether they do an 
adequate job of tracking the ways in which the other can be benefited or harmed—that 
is, ways in which circumstances will affect the other’s welfare. 
This is surely in the spirit of Dai Zhen’s project.  Dai does not think that just 
any desire we happen to have should contribute to our sympathetic reconstructions of 
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another’s point of view.  When Dai refers to the use of “desires” in moral deliberation, 
he means specifically those desires that belong to the “ordinary feelings of human 
beings” (ren zhi changqing 人之常情).11  These include the desires that belong to us 
by nature and have a universal or near-universal status in ordinary human beings.12  
They are also explanatorily basic desires—that is, desires in terms of which we can 
properly explain why one wants something more specific or idiosyncratic.  Thus, the 
desires we should have in ourselves are not for things like a longing to share a plate of 
fettuccini with one’s beloved, but a hunger for food (shi 食) or a yearning for romantic 
love (nannü 男女).13 
 Most of us believe that our desires provide us with crucial insight into well-
being, and that they do so in part because our good is importantly related to desire 
satisfaction.  Part of what makes lifelong companionship a good for me, it seems, is that 
(at least under certain idealized circumstances) I want it.  Dai Zhen shares these views 
deeply and emphatically, but it is not clear that he shares it for the reasons we might 
expect.  Generally speaking, we could give two sorts of accounts of how desire 
satisfaction is related to well-being.  One would be to see desire satisfaction as 
beneficial by virtue of some independent value, such as the pleasure or happiness that 
results from attaining one’s desired ends. We cannot take much joy in life, we might 
think, unless we sometimes meet our felt goals and ambitions; thus, desire satisfaction 
is useful instrumentally, to facilitate joy.  If there is an obvious alternative to the view 
that desire satisfaction is good by virtue of some independent value, it is that desire 
satisfaction simply is the good.  That is, to satisfy someone’s desires is just what it 
means to benefit that person. 
Of these two general strategies, certainly one of the prevailing temptations is to 
read Dai as advocating the second.  Dai Zhen identifies the sage-kings’ concern about 
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their subjects’ states of well-being (identified in classical sources by such terms as 
“hardship” [kun 困] and “poverty” [qiong 窮]) with their attendance to their subjects’ 
desires.  Furthermore, desire fulfillment (sui yu 遂欲) forms an important leitmotif in 
Dai’s moral philosophy, being invoked again and again as having a much-neglected 
explanatory power in proper moral judgment.14  
There is considerable evidence to suggest, however, that if anything Dai prefers 
a variant of the first of the two ways of relating desire to well-being, where the 
fulfillment of desires gets its worth from some other more fundamental and independent 
value.  In Dai’s case, however, the likely candidate for the latter value would not be 
happiness or pleasure as such, but would almost certainly be “life fulfillment” (sui 
sheng 遂生).  “In human existence,” Dai declares, “there is no greater affliction than to 
lack the means to fulfill one’s life (sui qi sheng).”15  Life, for Dai, brings with it its own 
set of demands.16  That is, just by virtue of being living creatures, we all have needs for 
certain goods, such as sustenance and development.  The needs that attach to life as 
such then take different forms according to the inborn “nature” (xing 性) of the living 
thing in question.17  And it is to the particular desires that arise from the structural 
requirements of living (and, we might add, “growing”) that the truly virtuous or 
“humane” (ren 仁) person is supposed to attend:  “If in desiring to fulfill one’s own life, 
one thereby fulfills the lives of others, this is humanity.”18 
Conceiving welfare as “life fulfillment,” in turn, allows Dai to link it more 
directly with the supreme good (shan 善) of sustaining the universe’s generative or life-
producing processes (sheng sheng 生生).19  “Life” (sheng) becomes a good when put 
into harmonious action with the productive forces of Heaven and Earth.  This is not to 
say that it is intrinsically good: to be valuable it must cohere with natural forces, as a 
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working part of the whole.20  But life also has demands of its own, being inherently 
dynamic and productive, and in these demands we find our grounds for pursuing our 
own well-being.  In other words, life fulfillment has value prior to and partially 
independent of our desiring it, and it is the high price we put on the life in ourselves 
that inspires us to act in our own interest:  “Because all creatures of blood and breath 
know the love of life and fear of death, therefore they pursue benefit and avoid harm.”21 
 The question we must ask then is how someone like Dai Zhen can maintain both 
that shu (or “sympathetic understanding”) helps us to track the well-being of others by 
projecting certain desires onto them and at the same time that it does not commit us to 
endorsing the judgments informed by whatever desires we happen to have.  How can 
we be more selective about the sorts of desires we imagine the other having, so as to 
give the life-fulfilling ones more normative weight?  Here I think we can mention two 
general answers.  First, we might imagine that independent constraints are imposed on 
the desires selected by shu.  Second, we might imagine that shu itself is selective about 
the desires that it causes us to synthesize.  As I argue, Dai thinks the first sort of answer 
is helpful to a degree, but he is unusual in stressing the second answer as well. 
 In the spirit of the first answer, one might point out that we are not always 
obliged to endorse the picture of the other’s psychological landscape that our 
sympathetic imaginations are inclined to create.22  We might imagine a fellow fanatical 
fan being willing to sacrifice his career to see the home team win, but on reflection 
allow that this preference is simply too strong or irrational.  Another appealing strategy 
is to regulate the sorts of desires that go into our deliberations in the first place.  I would 
be less inclined to attribute wild or self-destructive desires to Wang if I myself am a 
person of moderate temperament, or at least if I can recognize which of my desires 
would be inappropriate.  Dai’s philosophical antagonist Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) 
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tackles a perceived problem in mistaken desires in just this way, suggesting that we first 
see to it that we clearly understand the standards of moral order (ming li 明理) and 
rectify our hearts and minds (zheng xin 正心) and only then proceed to use ourselves 
as the standards by which we measure others.23  
 Dai Zhen certainly believes we should avail ourselves of these sorts of 
correctives.  A crucial component of being a good judge of others’ inclinations, for 
example, is having at least reasonably well-ordered inclinations oneself.  And Dai 
allows that we can develop a knack for second-guessing our sympathetic judgments 
over time.24 But it is much less certain that Dai would share the intuitive grounds for 
adopting these strategies as I have described them above.  To motivate these strategies, 
after all, I simply assumed that some check against mistaken desires had to be 
introduced either before the exercise of shu (in the corrective inspired by Zhu Xi) or 
after it (in pointing out that we could refuse to endorse our shu-based judgments).  But 
this omits another possibility that, when compared with our everyday processes of 
moral deliberation, should strike us as the far more natural one: namely, that shu itself 
plays some critical role in determining which sorts of desires are true indicators of our 
well-being and which are not. 
We can appreciate the importance of this latter alternative by comparing it with 
the model inspired by Zhu Xi.25  By Zhu Xi’s account we begin either with refined 
desires in ourselves, or at least by specifying which desires would qualify as refined, 
and once we have done that we go on to practice shu.  But this fits awkwardly with our 
everyday experience of sympathy-based moral reasoning (which shu may well not be, 
on Zhu’s reading).  If some exigency tempts me to miss a lunch with George, and I 
want to imagine how George might feel about this before committing to it, it would be 
strange to say that I should have either perfectly “rectified” desires, or a clear account 
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of which desires are the right ones, in advance of putting myself in his shoes.  A major 
motivation for Dai’s turn to shu is his supposition that it can help less-than-ideal moral 
thinkers muddle through their daily lives,26 and for these purposes Zhu’s prerequisites 
seem too rigorous to put into practice.  It makes much more sense to say that my attempt 
to sympathetically reconstruct his point of view itself plays some selective role, helping 
me to determine which sorts of desires I should take into account as I proceed.  Much 
as grief for the passing of a loved one, for example, lays bare the ways in which the 
deceased contributed to our personal fulfillment—ways of which we often had little or 
no awareness prior to grieving—so too does sympathy help to focus and make more 
vivid the facts that are salient for determinations of well-being. 
 If we can accept this as a psychological possibility, then this presents us with 
two distinct models of sympathetic understanding.  Under the first model, shu’s real 
work in tracking well-being is accomplished through perspective-taking.  Its primary 
contribution to my attempt to understand George, and know what is good for him, lies 
in my imagining myself as him, feeling as he would feel and wanting as he would want.  
Shu is “naive” in the sense that it adopts a set of desires uncritically.  This is not to say 
that we adopt them uncritically—as we saw, this naive model is perfectly compatible 
with the view that we should exercise discretion either before or after our sympathetic 
reconstruction of the other’s point of view.  But it does imply that shu exercises no 
discretion itself, and this is precisely what the second model rejects.  For the latter, 
which I shall ultimately attribute to Dai Zhen, shu plays a crucial part in helping us to 
determine which sorts of desires are true indicators of well-being, because shu is not 
just an exercise in perspective-taking, but also a way of valuing a person. 
 In pursuit of unearthing this more robust account of shu in Dai Zhen’s work, let 
me begin by offering a diagnosis of the motivations for the naive model of shu, where 
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its contribution to estimations of welfare lie exclusively in perspective-taking.  One of 
the chief reasons that this model is so alluring is that we moderns (especially those of 
us who are steeped in modern philosophy and social science) are predisposed to lend a 
certain explanatory authority to first-person deliberations about one’s own desires.27  If 
I want to say why a particular apple is good for Mary, I will be inclined to tell a story 
that ends in claims about what Mary wants.  I will most likely explain that she has a 
hunger for this particular kind of apple, and that the sustenance it offers will help her to 
get other things that she desires.  If I cite benefits that do not immediately invoke her 
desires—for example, if I mention that having an apple will help to sustain her 
concentration through the next few hours of work—I am likely to explain the goodness 
of these other things in terms of more fundamental desires (such as the desire to do 
good work, to win a promotion, etc.).  To be sure, it will not always be the case that 
Mary wants the apple, for it is not always the case that people want what is best for 
themselves.  But we tend to correct for this problem by saying that the apple is 
something she would want if only she were apprised of all of the relevant information 
and capable of making sound inferences from that information.  If only she knew that 
eating it would improve her concentration, and if only she knew how it tasted, she 
would then desire it. 
So understood, this deference to informed calculations about one’s own desires 
helps to explain why we tend to believe perspective-taking does all of the relevant work.  
After all, to determine what constitutes Mary’s well-being, it is sufficient to know what 
she would (under epistemically ideal circumstances) want.  If I err in determining what 
she would want, this is because I make bad inferences, or I do not have access to all of 
the relevant facts (for example, that she has an allergy to apples).  But these are mistakes 
in reasoning or information gathering, not mistakes in sympathizing itself.  Thus, the 
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explanatory power attributed to Mary’s informed desires has an important epistemic 
implication as well.  My inquiry into the constituents of her well-being may safely stop 
at the point that I am able to determine what Mary would ideally want.  Sympathizing 
with Mary may require more than this kind of perspective-taking, but insofar as we rely 
on sympathy to know what’s good for her, this perspective-taking exhausts its epistemic 
contribution.  
 For Dai Zhen, both the naive account and its motivating assumptions would be 
highly dubious.  The first and perhaps most notable problem is that it commits us to a 
peculiar doctrine about altruistic or disinterested desires: namely, that they are always 
mistaken desires, and that it would be impossible to rationally want something self-
sacrificial (or at least not beneficial) in light of full information.  Since the informed 
desire theory holds that my good is whatever I would rationally want given full 
knowledge of a certain kind, it is committed to the view that I could never under those 
circumstances want something bad for myself.  This is a major criticism of “informed 
desire” or “full information” theories of welfare in contemporary philosophy and social 
science, a criticism that Amartya Sen has captured succinctly in accusing informed 
desire theorists of “definitional egoism.”28  And it is not difficult to see how it would 
run against the grain of Dai Zhen’s deeply Confucian understanding of human moral 
psychology. 
 Consider, for example, the desire of parents for their children’s future health 
and prosperity.  It is reasonable to assume, surely, that many mothers and fathers would 
in light of full information quite rationally want things for their children that come at 
great cost to themselves.  Many are willing to give up a great deal of their freedom and 
leisure to see to it that their children have the kind of lives that, long after their parental 
benefactors are gone, the children will continue to find meaningful and satisfying.29  
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And this sacrificial urge to provide for the long-term well-being of one’s children tends 
to be both deeply felt and something of which its possessors are intimately aware.  If 
this sort of thing does not qualify as a desire, it is difficult to imagine what would. 
Defenders of the informed desire approach might try to explain this 
phenomenon away by suggesting that in fulfilling the interests of one’s children, the 
benevolent parent also fulfills her own interests—that the utility function of the parent 
reflects the utility function of the child, as economists sometimes put it.  But this is too 
facile an explanation.  The very language of this sort of sacrifice requires that we allow 
for trade-offs between parent and child welfare.  One might even feel a powerful drive 
to give up her life in order to spare her child from pain, and while it might give her 
some comfort to know the benefits of her sacrifice as she goes to her grave, it would be 
both wrong and unfair to describe such comfort as a good for her that is proportional to 
the strength of her desire for it. 
 Given the place of prominence of filial piety in the Confucian moral order, Dai 
tends to stress the particular subset of desires where the sacrificial relationship is 
reversed, so as to highlight the filial disposition to want the well-being of one’s parents 
over and above one’s own.  This disposition exists not just in human beings, but (Dai 
claims) in any living creature that has an awareness of its parents and thus can be seen 
even in the way birds feed their mothers in old age.30  But despite this emphasis, Dai is 
clear that many kinds of self-sacrificial inclinations exist, not only for one’s parents, 
but also for one’s progeny, one’s mate, and even in some minimal sense for members 
of one’s own species.31 
 These sorts of phenomena are ones that any reasonable picture of human 
psychology must accommodate, and they point to an entire sphere of informed desires 
that do not fall neatly within the purview of self-beneficial ones.  More to the point, 
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however, is that they point to a more nuanced account of self-interest (si 私).  Consider 
what sense (or nonsense) we would have to make of the claim that Martin, who is fully 
informed about the choices before him, “wants his own good.”  For an informed desire 
thinker this sort of statement would be redundant: the fact that Martin wants anything 
under these epistemically ideal circumstances is sufficient reason to take it to be good 
for him.  But I suspect that most of us will find this to run against our considered 
convictions, for we tend to understand self-interest not just as wanting whatever we 
would want under full information, but also of having a certain self-directed pro-
attitude.  To be self-interested is to consider one’s own well-being valuable and thus to 
desire it as an end.32  This, surely, is a noticeable feature of Dai Zhen’s understanding 
of self-interestedness: 
 
Whether one cares self-interestedly only for oneself (私於身), or 
whether one extends [this care] to those near and dear to oneself, 
these are both kinds of humane love.  To care for oneself is to 
love oneself (仁其身), and to extend it to those near and dear to 
oneself is to love one’s intimates.33 
 
There are a few things to note about this passage.  First, if Dai thought that 
informed desires were definitionally egoistic, it would be strange to add that self-
interest (si) requires the attitude of “loving” (or “loving humanely” [ren 仁]) oneself.  
This sort of attitude, understood by most Confucian thinkers as requiring a substantial 
mechanism of psychological habits and attitudes, would appear to be the 
epiphenomenal icing on the motivational cake.  Having correct desires would already 
be enough.   
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Second, Dai’s point here is that self-interest and generous feelings toward one’s 
intimates are not really different in kind.  Both share a fundamental feature in common.  
What is it?  If we look at the way Dai sets up this proclamation about self-interest, we 
can begin to see the contours of an answer: 
 
All creatures of blood and qi know the love of life and fear of 
death, and therefore pursue benefit and avoid harm.  Although 
they differ in understanding, they are nevertheless the same in 
not going beyond this love of life and fear of death…. The love 
of that which has given one life [one’s parents], the love of that 
to which one has given life [one’s children]…all of this proceeds 
from the love of life and fear of death.34 
 
Earlier I suggested that Dai Zhen’s account of well-being is best understood as 
what he calls “life fulfillment” (sui sheng), a turn of phrase deeply evocative of Dai’s 
highest good, “producing and sustaining life” (sheng sheng).  Here again Dai makes the 
connection between life and well-being explicit: insofar as we love life and fear death, 
he says, we seek benefits and try to avoid harms.  The question, however, is whose 
benefits we seek and whose harms we avoid, and Dai’s answer is that it depends on 
whose life we love.  Whether we want our parents to fare well or whether we want 
ourselves to prosper, both sorts of want share a common attitude: namely, a love of the 
life that belongs to the person in question.  This suggests, pace the informed desire 
view, that knowledgeable desiring is not, ultimately, a sufficient condition for self-
interest.  To be self-interested we must also have the right sort of feeling—“love” (huai 
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懷)—toward our own life, with all of the structural demands of which that life is 
constituted. 
 To be sure, it is much easier to elicit a love of one’s own life than it is to love 
another’s.  Dai seems to assume that for most of us the latter will never come so 
effortlessly as the former, which is one reason why the imaginative exercise of putting 
oneself in another’s place is so important.35  But Dai reminds us that just because our 
self-love comes relatively effortlessly we should not assume that this feeling, so crucial 
to wanting the good of someone else, is somehow missing in cases where the life in 
question is one’s own.  To care deeply about one’s own well-being requires the same 
robust feeling of attachment as caring deeply about the well-being of anyone else.36 
The final point to make about the passage on si is that it has implications not 
just for the motivational requirements of self-interest, but for the epistemic 
requirements as well.  That is, we depend on a self-directed sense of humanity even to 
understand what is in our own self-interest.  To be humanely disposed toward someone 
is more than a matter of being inclined to act on a series of already specified ends, as 
though it could be our humanity that drives us to help a child, but something else that 
specifies the particular ways in which the child needs help.  Humanity is also the virtue 
by which we come to recognize which ends are worthwhile in the first place.37 
This helps to fill out the more robust, nonnaive account of shu that we need.  It 
suggests that this felt attachment to someone’s life and life fulfillment, over and above 
the attachment to someone’s desire fulfillment, is doing some of the necessary work in 
helping us to distinguish the truly self-interested desires from the rest, even in the cases 
where the desires in question are our own.  There is remarkably strong prima facie 
evidence for this more nuanced phenomenology of self-interest. Surely we can 
distinguish between “what we want” and “what we want for our own sake,” at least 
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much of the time. I know that having my home team win would not benefit me in 
proportion to the strength of my desire for it, and it seems likely that my ability to adopt 
some caring or loving stance toward myself has something to do with this insight.38  
Needless to say it is not sufficient for this insight—and Dai Zhen is eager to supplement 
our deliberations with the refinement in judgment and knowledge of the world that 
comes with effective self-cultivation—but it is necessary all the same.  Most of our 
attempts to take the well-being of others into account requires this “love of life and fear 
of death” at a minimum.  It is an intellectualist’s fantasy that we will appreciate the 
relevant demands of life with sufficient depth, that we will be able to see them vividly, 
without this love.39 
In the fundamental matter of taking proper account of welfare goods then I find 
this “love of life”—so often invoked by Dai—to be absolutely vital.  However, there is 
a second contribution made by “humanity toward oneself” that I want to offer in a 
slightly more tentative way, and that contribution is a shift in point of view.  For Dai 
Zhen, the feeling of humanity or benevolence toward someone, which he understands 
as a feeling aimed at “fulfilling one’s life,”40 almost always contains within it some 
sympathetic understanding of the people whose lives are to be fulfilled.  To be sure, not 
all close followers of Confucius see humanity as constituted by some exercise of shu, 
and many of Dai Zhen’s Neo-Confucian predecessors insist that shu should eventually 
drop out of our deliberative repertoire as we strive to become humane people.41  But for 
Dai Zhen shu figures centrally in being humane, and generally speaking one cannot be 
the latter without at the same time exercising the former.42  It is quite likely, therefore, 
that self-interest requires “humanity” because the latter includes within it a kind of 
sympathetic understanding.  The act of considering myself from a sympathetic stance—
as a concerned observer might consider me, comparing her case to my own—plays an 
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important part in helping me to highlight the desires whose ends are important for my 
own life fulfillment. 
A revealing detail in this respect is Dai’s tendency to describe shu not just as a 
way of studying the feelings of others, but also as manner of “returning to oneself” (fan 
gong 反躬),43 an expression he takes from the “Record of Music” (“Yueji” 樂記).44  
For Dai Zhen, “returning to oneself” is essentially the form of self-examination that we 
undertake in order to introspectively evaluate our behavior before we commit to it.  So 
quite naturally, Dai typically presents it as something we should do before imposing 
ourselves on others.  “Whenever one does something to another,” he offers, “one should 
return to oneself and calmly reflect: If another were to do this to me, would I be able to 
bear it?”45  This may seem to suggest that we use it primarily to gain insight into the 
would-be psychological landscape of others, but if we scrutinize Dai’s analysis of the 
expression more carefully, we see that it does more work than this.  Additionally, it also 
helps us to distinguish between our own desires, telling us which ones are superfluous 
or meddlesome and which ones really count.  And those that really count are the core 
of basic desires that we share in common with other human beings.  This is a notion 
that Dai takes once again from the “Record of Music,” noting how it attributes to all of 
us a common set of essential dispositions or true feelings (qing 情) to which belong the 
desires that are most essentially our own.46  Thus, the process of “returning to oneself” 
accomplishes at least two things: it helps us to understand how we would feel were we 
in another’s shoes, but importantly it also helps to clarify which desires we are rightly 
expected to take into account.  Surely the latter accomplishment sheds as much light on 
ourselves as it does on others. 
“When certain doctrines enter deeply into the hearts of human beings,” Dai 
declares, “their harm is great, and yet no one is able to awaken to them.”47  Dai is clear 
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that he sees both a healthy use of one’s own desires, as well as a proper reliance on shu, 
as the remedy for the prudential blindness that he finds stored away in the moral ideals 
of his age.  What I have tried to do here is show that, in an important sense, the latter 
that is more fundamental than the former.  It is our success at understanding ourselves 
as objects of sympathy that informs our evaluations of well-being, and not the other 
way around.  Shu brings with it the right emotional attachment and sufficient distance 
from internal point of view to shed light on the sorts of interests and inclinations that 
truly matter, and so it becomes less the flimsy exercise of perspective-taking and more 
the familiar emotional attitude of sympathetic understanding as we characteristically 
see it in our everyday deliberations.  As such, it is better suited to serve as the more 
fundamental source of insight into the human good. 
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21凡血氣之屬皆知懷生畏死，因而趨利避害.  Here the Chinese for “therefore” (yin’er 因
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life and fear of death) (Evidential Study, chap. 21 [xing/2]).  In other words, “therefore” 
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are impartial (gong 公) his deeds will be self-serving (si 私)” (Concordance to Master 
Zhu’s “Questions and Answers on the Four Books,” ed. Toshimizu Goto [Hiroshima: 
Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu, 1955],  487). 
24 Evidential Study, chap. 41 (quan/2). 
25 I say this model is “inspired by” Zhu Xi, rather than directly attributable to him, because 
it is uncertain that Zhu is particularly concerned that the right desires be directed toward 
one’s own good.  It might be, after all, that he sees it primarily as a matter of making them 
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believes they should line up with both, but his analysis in the Questions and Answers 
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moral wisdom focuses on the sage figure, and yet that the rest of us still need to call on our 
own less-than-sagely faculties in order to resolve our everyday affairs: “All people have 
business that concerns the household, the affairs of state, and the world.  Can it really be 
that we must await the wisdom of the sage before we can act?”  I have argued elsewhere 
that Dai offers shu as the preferred form of moral deliberation for imperfect adjudicators 
like ourselves (Acquiring “Feelings that Do Not Err,” chap. 1). 
27 For example, we find this tendency in such luminaries as John Rawls (Theory of Justice 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971], chap. 7), R. M. Hare (Moral Thinking: 
Its Levels, Method, and Point [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], chap. 5), and Joseph Raz 
(The Morality of Freedom [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986], chap. 12). 
28 Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare, and Measurement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), chap. 
4. 
29 Mark Overvold has made effective use of a case much like this one in “Self-Interest and 
the Concept of Self-Sacrifice,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980): 105–18, 
especially 108. 
30 Not all animals show the same sort of filial piety, nor do they tend to make the same sorts 
of sacrifices for their fathers.  But Dai says this is because they are unaware of their 
parentage, not because they lack the relevant dispositions.  See Evidential Study, chap. 21 
(xing/2). 
31 All living creatures show some basic willingness to sacrifice for members of their own 
species, Dai says, insofar as they demonstrate a great reluctance to eat their own kind 
(Evidential Study, chap. 21 [xing/2]). 
32 As the ethicist Stephen Darwall points out, a depressive or self-loathing person might not 
want her own good, and while we might tell her that she is misinformed about what she 
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and what I really want is bad for me.” She may simply fail to value herself (and thus what 
is good for her) in the way that we would expect (Welfare and Rational Care [Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002], 5–6). 
33 Evidential Study, chap. 21 (xing/2). 
34 Ibid. 
35  Except, perhaps, in the problematic case of the sage, who is able to extend such love to 
others.  I discuss this likely exception in Acquiring “Feelings that Do Not Err,” chap. 2, 
section 6. 
36 To be sure, it sounds awkward to use language normally reserved for moral praise to 
describe the essentially self-serving accomplishment of wanting one’s own good.  And 
Dai’s handling of the phraseology reflects this awkwardness, specifying that the love of 
one’s self and intimates are mere “kinds of humanity” (that is, they are in the territory of 
humanity or humane love [ren zhi shu 仁之屬]).  But even if we can only speak in terms 
of quasi-humanity (or quasi-humane love) the basic point remains the same: the core 
attitude that motivates the love of others (a kind of care or concern for a particular person 
that Dai cashes out as a “love” of that person’s “life”) is essentially the same attitude that 
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37 Evidential Study, chaps. 21 (xing/2), 36 (ren, yi, li, zhi/1), 41 (quan/2), and passim. 
38 I owe this crucial observation (and much else in this essay) to Darwall’s Welfare and 
Rational Care. I describe some fundamental differences between Dai and Darwall in 
Acquiring “Feelings that Do Not Err,” chap. 5, section 3. 
39 To hark back to an earlier analogy, this is as unlikely as it is that we can appreciate 
someone’s everyday, often invisible contributions without some powerful emotion like 
grief to highlight them.  Grief helps to focus our attention on the little things that the 
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deceased has done for the griever, making the absence of these things more palpable to the 
griever, and thus enabling her to recognize and appreciate the deceased’s contributions in 
a way that would never be available to her without her grief. 
40 See the opening lines of Evidential Study, chap. 36 (ren, yi, li, zhi/1).  
41 Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) all 
regard ren as a virtue not unlike shu in its results, in that it makes one do things that 
harmonize with the desires of others, but as a means they regard shu as being too 
deliberative and affectively laden for truly humane thoughts and behavior.  On this point, 
see David Nivison’s “Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy,” in The Ways 
of Confucianism, ed. Bryan Van Norden (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 69–70. 
42 Most commentators agree that one can be shu (sympathetically understanding) without 
exhibiting the fuller virtue of ren.  But they appear to differ on the question of whether one 
can be ren without also at the same time being shu.  Dai Zhen is clear that at least the 
nonsages among us cannot and cites Mengzi to make his case:  “To act out of robust 
sympathetic understanding—in seeking humanity, there is nothing closer than this” (強恕
而行, 求仁莫近焉; Mengzi 7A4, discussed in Dai’s Evidential Study, chap. 41 [quan/2]).  
See also the last two steps of the three-step ascent to humane virtue, as Dai describes it:  
“To take one’s self and extend it [to others] is ‘sympathetic understanding’ (shu), and to 
share in the sorrows and joys of others is ‘humanity’ (ren)” (Evidential Study, chap. 15 
[li/15]). 
43 Ibid., chaps. 2 (li/2), 11 (li/11).  
44 “When one’s loves and aversions are not regulated internally, and one’s understanding is 
led astray by external things, one cannot return to oneself and the heavenly patterns of good 
order are extinguished” (“Record of Music,” chap. 19 of Record of Rituals, Sibu congkan 
edition, 11.7b5–8); emphasis is mine. 
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